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1. Introduction 
The emergence of China has forced other developing countries to contend with 
the threat of a concentration of multinational enterprises (MNEs) in China. China has 
attracted a vast volume of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since 1979, the country has 
attracted foreign firms as part of her export promotion policy and since 1990, the 
increase in inward FDI has been remarkable. In particular, it expanded rapidly after 
Xiao-Ping Deng’s “Southern Tour Speech” in 1992. Furthermore, the rate of its 
increase seems to have been steadier since the country joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO). As a result, in 2008, according to FDISTAT (UNCTAD), the 
inward FDI stock is ranked 1
st
 among developing countries (10
th
 in the world). 
Because of this large inward FDI in China, policy makers in developing countries, 
particularly ASEAN countries, have been concerned about the decrease in inward FDI 
in these countries due to it being replaced with FDI in China. In short, China has been 
perceived as a potential absorber of the world’s FDI to developing countries. 
     In the academic field, there are a large number of studies investigating in what 
kinds of countries MNEs locate.
1
 This is a well-known location choice analysis. In this 
literature, there are two main topics. The first topic examines various kinds of location 
factor such as the agglomeration of firms belonging to the same firm group (e.g., 
Belderbos and Carree, 2002) or investment climate-related elements (free trade zones 
in the US, Head et al., 1999; special economic zones and opening coastal cities in 
China, Belderbos and Carree, 2002; Objective 1 structural funds and cohesion funds in 
Europe, Basile et al., 2008). The second topic explores the substitution of location by 
examining inclusive values in the nested logit model: Basile, Castellani, and Zanfei 
(2009); Disdier and Mayer (2004); Mayer et al. (2010). For instance, Disdier and 
Mayer (2004) investigate whether French multinational firms consider Western Europe 
and Eastern Europe to be two distinct groups of potential host countries by examining 
the coefficient for the inclusive value in nested logit estimation. They confirm the 
differentiation between Eastern Europe and Western Europe in their country location 
decision and furthermore show that this relevance decreases. 
This paper investigates the location choice of Japanese MNEs in East Asian 
developing countries
2
 and shows three notable points compared with existing studies. 
                                                   
1
 Recent references are as follows: Head, Ries, and Swenson (1999) for Japanese MNEs in the US; 
Belderbos and Carree (2002) for Japanese MNEs in China; Head and Mayer (2004) for Japanese 
MNEs in Europe; Disdier and Mayer (2004) for French MNEs in Europe; Castellani and Zanfei 
(2004) for large MNEs in the world; Mayer, Mejean, and Nefussi (2007) for French MNEs in the 
world; Crozet, Mayer, and Mucchielli (2004) for MNEs in France; and Basile, Castellani, and 
Zanfei (2008) for MNEs in Europe. 
2
 They include China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, 
 3 
First, our paper investigates the location choice of MNEs with different FDI motivation 
from previous studies. Most existing studies examine the location choices of MNEs 
among developed countries, particularly European countries. In this sense, existing 
studies examine the location choice in the case of market-seeking FDI (or horizontal 
FDI). On the other hand, our sample host countries consist of developing countries 
with widely different levels of economic development. For example, even the poorest 
host country in Disdier and Mayer (2004), Bulgaria (3,513 US$), in terms of GDP per 
capita in 2005 has a middling income between the richest and second-richest host 
countries in this paper, Malaysia (5,329 US$) and Thailand (2,797 US$), respectively. 
Also, some countries including Cambodia and Laos have an income of less than 500 
US$. Thus, for investors from Japan, which has an income of 35,603 US$, FDIs in 
such host countries should mostly be motivated by their cheap labor.
3
 In other words, 
contrast to existing studies, our paper tries to investigate the location choice of MNEs 
in the case of cheap labor-seeking FDI (or vertical FDI) rather than that in the case of 
market-seeking FDI.  
Second, in spite of our focus on developing countries, our examination of 
location choice is conducted at the sub-national level, not the national level. There 
seem to be more relevant differences not only across countries but also across 
provinces within a nation in less developed countries than in advanced countries. 
Mostly, only capital cities are rich in developing countries in terms of income, 
infrastructure, and so on. Indeed, policies for enhancing economic development are 
sometimes conducted selectively or gradually in terms of regional coverage. For 
example, the target provinces of the open-door policy were originally concentrated in 
the coastal region of China. Thus, a sub-national-level analysis is crucially important in 
examining location choice among less developed countries. However, it is much more 
difficult to collect sub-national-level data in less developed countries. Such data are not 
available in a ready-made format, unlike the case of European countries, i.e., 
EUROSTAT. Thus, to the best of our knowledge, our study is also the first to analyze 
the location choice of MNEs among developing countries at the sub-national level. 
Such an analysis will enable us to uncover relevant location characteristics in detail. 
Third, as in the second topic in the location choice literature, we seek the 
appropriate nesting structure of the location choices of Japanese MNEs in East Asian 
countries, i.e., their substitution patterns among these countries. For example, we 
                                                                                                                                                     
and Indonesia. 
3
 The numbers presented in this paragraph are drawn from the World Development Indicators 
Online. 
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intend to investigate empirically whether Japanese MNEs consider China and ASEAN 
countries to be two distinct groups of potential host countries by examining the 
inclusive value parameters in the nested logit estimation. This analysis is expected to 
give us some insight into the above-mentioned policy makers’ concern regarding 
whether or not, for foreign investors, China is substitute for or complement to ASEAN 
countries. In particular, unlike existing studies, we estimate the higher stage of nesting 
structures, i.e., three- or four-stage nested logit models. Such models allow us not only 
to capture less restrictive substitution patterns among choices than the standard 
conditional/two-stage nested logit model but also to clarify MNEs’ perception of more 
detailed location substitution patterns among East Asian developing countries.
4
  
Under this framework, we investigate the location choice of MNEs in the case of 
cheap labor-seeking FDI. For an analysis of this type of FDI, this paper sheds light on 
location elements that previous studies in the case of market-seeking FDI may have not 
explored intensively. These elements are the host country’s tariff rates on products 
from the investing country, the existence of well-paved highways, and the existence of 
airports/seaports. Since cheap labor-seeking FDI aims to conduct a production 
process-wise vertical division of labor between the host and the home country, broadly 
defined trade costs between these two countries are crucially important in the case of 
this type of FDI. Therefore, these elements relating to trade costs are expected to play 
an essential role in attracting Japanese FDI to East Asian developing countries. Also, 
the roles of WTO membership and bilateral investment treaties are examined, which 
will contribute to settling trade and investment disputes in host countries. These roles 
will be relevant particularly in the case of FDI in developing countries because these 
countries have various relatively high country risks compared with developed 
countries. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the nested logit 
model for our analysis. Section 3 provides the details of our empirical model, namely 
location elements. After reporting our data sources in Section 4, we present the 
estimation results in Section 5. Last, we conclude our paper in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Nested logit Model 
We examine what location characteristics matter in the sub-national-level location 
                                                   
4
 Basile et al. (2008) estimate the mixed logit model, which may capture less restrictive 
substitution patterns among choices than our three/four-stage nested logit models. However, our 
primary interest lies in the results of these nested logit models to provide some answers to the 
above-mentioned policy makers’ concerns. 
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choice of MNEs in East Asian developing countries during the period 1996-2006. 
Specifically, we choose the province level as a sub-national level. Then, the discrete 
choice model of MNE investment is estimated. The use of a discrete choice model 
seems to be more appropriate in our case than in the case of other studies, i.e., the 
analysis of location choices of MNEs among developed countries. A discrete choice 
model is one in which agents such as firms choose the alternative with the highest 
utility or profit. In the case of market-seeking FDI/horizontal FDI, firms are often 
assumed to make a decision on whether to invest or export for each alternative (see, for 
example, Yeaple, 2009). On the other hand, “the purest form of vertical FDI is a model 
in which a multinational firm evaluates all potential destination markets to find the one 
that is the lowest-cost provider of the activity it wishes to relocate” (Blonigen et al., 
2007). In short, when analyzing vertical FDI, the assumption underlying the theoretical 
model is more consistent with the setting of the discrete choice model. In order to take 
similarity among provinces within the same nation into account, we employ the nested 
logit model.  
     The familiar two-stage nested logit model is as follows. Now assume that we 
have N firms in our sample. Let set of alternatives j be partitioned into K 
non-overlapping subsets denoted G1, G2,…, GK and are called nests. For firm n faced 
with J alternatives (province), suppose that a random profit indicator of province j in 
nest Gk is: 
           ,   where         . 
V is the nonstochastic representative profit, which varies over alternatives with a nest. 
xnj is a vector of variables that describe alternative j, and β is a vector of parameters to 
be estimated. ε varies randomly and is assumed to follow the generalized extreme 
value (GEV) distribution, which has the following cumulative distribution: 
            
    
  
 
    
 
   
   
   
Parameter τk measures the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the 
alternatives in nest k and is called a dissimilarity parameter or an inclusive value 
parameter (an IV parameter). 
     Under this setting, it is shown that the probability of choosing alternative   
  is expressed as (for more details of derivation, see Train, 2003): 
                
where 
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Ink is called the inclusive value for the kth subset and is defined as: 
                  
    
  
Assuming that each firm’s choice is independent of that of other firms, the 
log-likelihood function to be maximized is given by: 
                 
    
 
   
 
   
  
where ynj is a binary variable indicating the choice made by firm n so that for each n, 
only one ynj is 1 and the rest are 0 for all j. 
     It is well known that in the conditional logit model (or the multinomial logit 
model), the odds ratio, Pni/Pnj, does not depend on the other alternatives. This property 
is called “independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA).” The inclusion of IV 
parameters in the nested logit model allows us to incorporate some degree of 
heteroscedasticity. Only within each subset does the IIA restriction continue to hold. A 
sufficient condition for global consistency with the random utility model (RUM) is that 
the IV parameter lies between 0 and 1. When τk = 1 for all k, indicating no correlation 
among the unobserved elements with each nest, this model can be reduced to the 
simple conditional logit model.
5
 
     This two-stage nested logit model can be easily extended to a higher-stage 
nested logit model. For example, in the case of the three-stage model, we further 
assume that each subset Gk can be partitioned into Mk non-overlapping sets denoted gk1, 
gk2,…, gkMk. Then, the following cumulative distribution is assumed for random term ε: 
              
    
  
 
     
 
  
     
   
 
  
 
   
   
υk is again a dissimilarity parameter. The probability of choosing an alternative is 
expressed as: 
                          
where 
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 For simplicity, this paper assumes the common IV parameters among nests. 
 7 
                  
     
            
  
  
    
  
   
  
The extension of the model to higher than three levels is also feasible, though we do 
not show it because of the cumbersome notation. 
 
 
3. Location Elements 
This section specifies our profit function. It should be based on the model that 
describes the mechanics of cheap labor-seeking FDI. Well-known references for such a 
model include Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), and 
Helpman (1984). Even if we assume any kind of model, the profit function will include 
the same kind of elements as in the case of market-seeking FDI though the functional 
form for each element differs according to the assumed model: demand size, primary 
production factor prices, prices of intermediate goods, trade costs with the home 
country, and fixed entry costs. In the following, we explain the proxies for these 
variables that we use for our estimation. But notice that our sub-national-level analysis 
in the case of developing countries prevents us from introducing certain location 
elements included in previous studies, e.g., education level of laborers, due to lack of 
data availability. 
The market size is captured by introducing the distance-weighted sum of the 
gross regional domestic product (GRDP), which is constructed at the province level. 
This measure is called market potential and is known to work just as well as 
sophisticated measures that take the price index into account, from an empirical point 
of view (Head and Mayer, 2004). The literature on cheap labor-seeking FDI does not 
shed central light on the role of market size. For example, it is noted that the 
surrounding market potential should be insignificant in a well-specified model of a 
vertical form of FDI, since the output of the subsidiary is simply shipped back to the 
parent country (Blonigen et al. 2007). However, from an empirical point of view, the 
market size may still have a positive influence in attracting ethe host economy. To 
capture the market size in not only the province concerned but also its surrounding 
provinces, we introduce the distance-weighted sum of all provinces’ GRDP in our 
sample.  
The lower the wages in a province, the more an MNE is likely to invest in it. In 
general, other things being equal, lower wages lead to lower production costs, cheaper 
product prices, and greater supply of products. As a result, since firms in provinces 
with lower wages obtain higher total profit, they are more likely to choose to locate in 
 8 
provinces with lower wages. In particular, in the case of cheap labor-seeking FDI, 
wages should be one of the most important location choice elements. As a proxy for 
wages, we simply use GRDP per capita in each province because direct data on labors’ 
wages are not available for our sample countries. However, GRDP per capita may also 
be related to the magnitude of fixed entry costs because it also serves as a proxy for the 
extent of socio-economic development. Thus, the coefficient for GRDP might be 
positive or negative in our model. 
As usual, data on price indexes for intermediate goods are unavailable. In this 
paper, we use the variable reflecting the magnitude of agglomeration as a proxy for 
that (“Agglomeration”). Since from the theoretical point of view the price index for 
intermediate goods is low in provinces with such large agglomeration, this proxy 
seems to be plausible. Specifically, we introduce the number of Japanese affiliates at 
the province level because Japanese MNEs procure a significant share of inputs from 
other Japanese MNEs. However, the use of this measure cannot again differentiate 
between two location elements, as in the case of GRDP per capita. The uncertainty of 
the market and operation environment is lower in provinces in which a larger number 
of Japanese firms already exist because new investors may be able to get this kind of 
information from existing firms. In other words, it will be also related to the magnitude 
of fixed entry costs. In any of these cases, we expect a positive coefficient. 
The proxy variables for trade costs are “Distance from Japan” and “Tariff Rates 
in the Host.” The “Distance from Japan” variable is constructed on a sub-national basis. 
This variable is expected to capture the physical transportation charge for intermediate 
goods from Japan to the host province and to have a negative coefficient. However, 
geographical distance from Japan is also partly associated with information costs 
between MNEs’ headquarters and their overseas plants. That is, a shorter geographical 
distance between them results in lower fixed entry costs because of the greater 
knowledge and the lower uncertainty about the host economy and of the more frequent 
information exchange between home and overseas plants. Again, in any of these cases, 
we expect a negative coefficient.  
 The “Tariff Rates in the Host” variable is a country-level (and sectoral) 
variable and the host country’s tariff rates on products from the home country, namely 
Japan. This variable is again one of the most important elements in the case of cheap 
labor-seeking FDI and should have a negative coefficient, unlike the case of 
market-seeking FDI. This is the location element that shows sharp contrast between 
market-seeking and cheap labor-seeking FDIs. Since market-seeking FDI has the 
motivation of so-called tariff jumping, the host economy’s tariff rates are expected to 
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have a positive impact on the location choice of MNEs. On the other hand, cheap 
labor-seeking FDI is motivated to engage in production process-wise vertical division 
of labor between the host and home countries. Thus, lower tariff rates in the host 
country enable potential MNEs to import their materials/inputs more cheaply from 
home and thus encourage them to invest in that country. As a result, the “Tariff Rates 
in the Host” variable is expected to have a negative coefficient. 
The proxy variables for fixed entry costs are two country-level variables: 
“WTO” and “BIT.” “WTO” is a dummy variable taking unity if a province is a WTO 
member country and zero otherwise. One of the major roles of the WTO is the 
multilateral reduction of tariff rates. As argued above, this role is already controlled by 
including bilateral tariff rates in products from Japan. However, WTO membership still 
plays certain roles including the settlement of trade disputes, which plays a role in 
reducing fixed entry costs and thus encouraging MNE investment. The “BIT” variable 
is a dummy variable, which takes unity if the host country concludes a bilateral 
investment treaty with Japan and zero otherwise. Its conclusion contributes to 
improving the investment environment and to settling investment-related disputes in 
the host country, resulting in an increase in Japanese FDI to that country. 
We include two further kinds of infrastructure-related variables at the province 
level. One is the dummy variable “Seaports/Airports,” which takes unity if a province 
has major seaports or airports. The other variable controls for accessibility to highways. 
“Asian Highway 1-digit” and “Asian Highway 2-digit” are dummy variables indicating 
unity if a province has 1-digit and 2-digit Asian highways, respectively. These 
variables are related to various kinds of elements. First, although our measure of 
market size adjusts transaction costs with other provinces using geographical distance, 
it also matters whether or not the province concerned has good accessibility to ports 
and/or well-paved highways. In this sense, introducing these infrastructure variables is 
expected to improve the incompleteness of our market potential measure in terms of 
controlling transaction costs with other provinces. Second, these variables also reflect 
some of the accessibility to foreign countries, particularly Japan, and are thus strongly 
related to trade costs with the home country. Not only airports/seaports but also 
highways are important because the existence of highways is key to accessing these 
ports. Particularly for importing materials and exporting products, these variables play 
a crucial role in the case of cheap labor-seeking FDI. 
 
 
4. Data Issues 
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In this section, we report our data sources and then present an overview of Japanese 
MNEs in East Asian countries. We examine the entry of Japanese MNEs in the 
aforementioned nine countries during 1996-2006: China, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. A list of provinces in each 
country is provided in Appendix 1. Our sample is restricted only to investments in the 
manufacturing industry. In this paper, we categorize each province into certain groups: 
coastal provinces
6
 in China into “Coastal”; internal provinces in China into “Internal”; 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand into “ASEAN4”; Cambodia, Laos, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam into “CLMV.” As mentioned in the introductory section, the 
Chinese government conducted different policy treatment between coastal and internal 
provinces. The classification of ASEAN4 and CLMV is because countries in CLMV 
joined ASEAN in a later period and followed a slower trade liberalization (tariff 
reduction) process than those in ASEAN4. ASEAN4 and CLMV are often called 
“forerunners of ASEAN” and “latecomers to ASEAN,” respectively. These groups are 
later used for structuring our nests in the estimation. 
The data on Japanese FDI in East Asia, which are necessary for constructing our 
dependent variable and calculating the “Agglomeration” variable, are basically 
obtained from Overseas Japanese Companies Data (Toyo Keizai Inc.). The data focus 
on a survey of 6,000 listed and non-listed enterprises, and include their overseas 
affiliate data on: location, investment year, investment type (new establishment, capital 
investment, and acquisition), amount of capital, total number of employees, number of 
employees from Japan, earnings, business content, purpose of investment, and funding 
relationship. The sample affiliates included in this database are those in which a 
Japanese firm has invested capital of 10% or more. In addition to Overseas Japanese 
Companies Data, we also use some other data sources as supplements because it is 
more difficult to obtain comprehensive data in less developed countries. Specifically, 
the following data are used: Foreign Direct Investment Companies in Myanmar 
(Myanmar Survey Research) for Japanese FDI in Myanmar; data on Japanese FDI in 
Cambodian and Laos prepared by the Cambodia Investment Board and the Department 
of Domestic and Foreign Investment, Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
respectively.  
Our data sources for location elements are as follows. Province-level data on 
population and GRDP per capita are obtained from the Statistical Yearbook of 
Myanmar of the Central Statistical Organization for Myanmar; the National Institute of 
                                                   
6
 The coastal provinces include Fujian, Guandong, Guangxi, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, 
Shandong, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. 
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Statistics (unofficial estimates of GRDP) for Cambodia; the National Statistical Center, 
Ministry of Planning and Investment for Laos; Socio-economic Statistical Data of 63 
Provinces and Cities for Vietnam; Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia for Indonesia; 
Yearbook of Statistics, Malaysia for Malaysia; Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia for 
Indonesia; Philippine Statistical Yearbook for the Philippines; China Statistical 
Yearbook for China. Unfortunately, GDP per capita is only available at the country 
level in Myanmar. Thus, we use the country-level GDP per capita for each province in 
Myanmar. While we use data on GRDP per capita as an explanatory variable, 
population data are used for calculating GRDP in each Myanmar province by 
multiplying population by GRDP per capita. 
The data sources of the other variables are as follows. Information on BIT and 
WTO membership is obtainable from Investment Instruments Online on the UNCTAD 
website
7
 and the WTO website,
8
 respectively. The sectoral tariff rates on products 
from Japan are drawn from the World Integrated Trade Solution (World Bank).
9
 
Geographical distance from Japan is calculated using latitudes and longitudes of Tokyo 
and each East Asian region. Also, the geographical distance among capital cities in our 
sample provinces is calculated in the same manner. Using the above-calculated GRDP 
and this distance dataset, we calculate the market potential measure, namely the sum of 
distance-weighted GRDP. Access by transportation is reflected by the “Port” dummy 
and “Asian Highway” dummy. Major seaports and international airports are listed in 
Appendices 2 and 3. Using the information gathered by UNESCAP,
10
 we construct 
“Asian Highway” dummies based on construction year. 
     Table 1 shows the new entry of Japanese MNEs in each country during 
1996-2006. There are three noteworthy points. First, Japanese firms have increased 
new investments to China drastically since its joining the WTO in 2001. The 
magnitude relation between FDIs to China and ASEAN was then reversed. China’s 
joining the WTO is an important turning point in Japanese FDI in East Asia. But, as is 
well known, Japanese FDI in China is concentrated in coastal provinces. Second, 
Thailand is the country attracting a largest number of Japanese MNEs among ASEAN 
countries. In most years, Thailand has attracted about half of the Japanese investments 
in ASEAN. Third, recently there are few differences in the number of Japanese 
                                                   
7
 http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/docsearch____779.aspx 
8
 http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm 
9
 Our sample includes 18 sectors: Food; Textiles; Wood; Paper; Printing; Chemicals; Petroleum; 
Rubber; Minerals; Basic Metals; Non-metals; Metals; Machinery; Electronics; Transport; 
Automobiles; Precision; Others 
10
 http://www.unescap.org/ttdw/common/tis/ah/Database.asp  
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affiliates between ASEAN4 and CLMV because of their remarkable decrease in 
ASEAN4. In particular, among CLMV countries, Japanese MNEs have invested most 
in Vietnam. As a result, Vietnam has recently become the second-largest recipient of 
Japanese FDI even among all ASEAN countries. 
 
===   Table 1   === 
 
     The sub-national-level distribution of Japanese affiliates entering during 
1996-2006 is shown in Figure 1. From this figure, we can see that a larger number of 
new Japanese affiliates are found in capital cities. In addition, coastal provinces in 
China and Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam attract a large number of Japanese affiliates. 
However, compared with the magnitude of their numbers in ASEAN countries, that in 
China is outstandingly large. The top 25 provinces in terms of entry of Japanese 
affiliates during 1996-2006 are reported in Table 2. Again, three points are noteworthy. 
First, seven provinces among the top 10 provinces are Chinese provinces. In particular, 
the top 3 provinces are all Chinese provinces and have an overwhelming number of 
Japanese firms entering. Second, provinces in some ASEAN countries are nominated 
among the top 25 provinces. The most highly ranked province in these countries is 
West Java in Indonesia, Bangkok in Thailand, Region IV-A in the Philippines, 
Selangor in Malaysia, and Hanoi in Vietnam. Third, as we can see from the second 
point, there are no provinces in Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar that are nominated 
among the top 25 provinces. 
 
===   Table 2 & Figure 1   === 
 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In this section, we report the estimation results of our nested logit model. We first 
search for a “good” nesting structure among provinces in East Asian countries. We then 
incorporate some characteristics of firms into our model. The basic statistics of our 
model are provided in Table 3. 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
     Before estimating nested logit models, we estimate the conditional logit model 
for reference. The results are reported in column (I) in Table 4. The findings are as 
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follows. As in existing studies, Japanese MNEs invest in provinces with better access 
to the market, those with a larger number of Japanese firms, and those in WTO 
member countries or BIT partners. The result of “GDP per Capita” indicates that 
provinces with lower GDP per capita tend to attract a larger number of MNEs. This 
implies the dominant effect of wages over that of the socio-economic environment. 
The coefficient for “Distance from Japan” is estimated to be significantly negative, 
indicating that MNEs are likely to invest in provinces less distant from the home 
country because they can save communication costs and transport costs between their 
plants and headquarters. Among infrastructural variables, a significant result can be 
found only in “Asian Highway 1-digit.” One possible interpretation is that the 
existence of ports is less important than that of wide roads with access to these ports. 
Last, the host country’s tariff rates on products from Japan have a significantly 
negative coefficient. As is consistent with our expectation and the prediction of vertical 
FDI theory, lower tariff rates in host countries matter in the case of vertical FDI. 
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
     Next, we will seek a good tree structure for Japanese investors among East Asian 
developing countries by estimating the nested logit model for our sample. However, 
we do not try to identify the nesting structure that would be most supported by the data 
because the number of alternatives and thus the number of possible nests in this paper 
are quite large and make the search for the best structure rather cumbersome. Instead, 
as mentioned in the previous section, based on the stage of economic development or 
regional differentiation of policies, we first partition a set of our sample provinces into 
the following four subgroups: CLMV (latecomers to ASEAN), ASEAN4 (forerunners 
of ASEAN), Coastal China, and Internal China. We then assume several types of 
upper-level decision by further grouping these four subgroups. The upper-level 
decision in column (II) is either to locate to [ASEAN4 & CLMV] or to [Coastal China 
& Internal China]. Similarly, the decision in (III) is either to locate to [ASEAN4], 
[CLMV], or [Coastal China & Internal China]; the decision in (IV) is either to locate to 
[ASEAN4], [CLMV], [Coastal China], or [Internal China]; the decision in (V) is either 
to locate to [CLMV] or [ASEAN4 & Coastal China & Internal China]; the decision in 
(VI) is either to locate to [CLMV], [ASEAN4 & Coastal China], or [Internal China]; 
the decision in (VII) is either to locate to [CLMV & Internal China] or [ASEAN4 & 
Coastal China]. Under these kinds of two-level tree structures, we estimate the 
two-level nested logit model for our sample. 
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The results of various types of two-stage nested logit model are reported in 
columns (II)-(VII). It is well known that “there is no well-defined testing procedure for 
discriminating among tree structures” (Greene, 2002, p. 727). In this paper, we shed 
light on the (log) likelihood and IV parameters, which can be used for evaluating the 
nesting structure to some extent. From the likelihood viewpoint, the tree structure in 
(V) is the best, though its difference among all patterns may be trivial. On the other 
hand, as mentioned in Section 2, the IV parameter must lie between 0 and 1 for global 
consistency with the RUM. The two models, i.e., (III) and (V), have IV parameters in 
this range. As a result, based on the criteria of both likelihood and IV parameters, we 
may conclude that the method of grouping in column (V) is the best among our six 
two-level tree structures. Under this grouping, we can see from the “LR test for IIA,” 
which reports the chi-squared statistics for testing whether or not the IV parameter is 
different from unity, that the IV parameter is statistically different from unity. Thus, we 
can say that the use of the conditional logit model is not appropriate. 
The results of the tree structure of (V) are as follows. First, among explanatory 
variables, major differences from the results in (I) are observed in “GRDP per Capita” 
and “Tariff rates in the Host,” for which coefficients are estimated to be significantly 
positive and insignificant, respectively. The positive result of “GRDP per Capita” 
indicates the dominant effect of socio-economic environment in contrast to the 
dominant effect of wages in the result of the conditional logit model. One possible 
reason for the insignificant result regarding tariffs is that our sample countries often 
exempt MNEs from paying tariffs on materials or parts imported for assembly and 
exported as finished products. This is the so-called incentive scheme for foreign 
investors and aims to attract a larger number of MNEs. As a result, an MNE enjoying 
this scheme does not need to worry about tariff rates in the host country. Second, this 
tree structure implies that Japanese MNEs consider CLMV countries to be host 
countries different from China and the forerunners of ASEAN. In other words, for 
Japanese investors, ASEAN forerunners are countries replaceable by China.  
Next, we estimate the higher-stage nested logit model. Two kinds of three-stage 
model to be estimated are depicted in Figures 2 and 3. Based on the above results in 
the two-stage nested logit model, the top-level decision is whether to invest in either 
[CLMV] or [China or ASEAN4]. The middle-level decision under the top-level 
decision of [China or ASEAN4] is whether to invest in either [China] or [ASEAN4] in 
Figure 2 and whether to invest in either [China], [Thailand], [the Philippines], 
[Malaysia], or [Indonesia] in Figure 3. The results for the first (Figure 2) and second 
(Figure 3) kinds of three-stage model are reported in columns (I) and (II) in Table 5, 
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respectively, and are similar to those in column (V) in Table 4. One difference between 
these two three-stage models lies in “GRDP per Capita”; while the one yields a 
significantly positive result, the other yields an insignificant result. In addition, both 
kinds of three-stage model have an RUM consistent IV parameters at all levels of 
decision. However, our three-stage nested logit models do not improve the fitness for 
data from the viewpoint of log-likelihood, compared with the two-stage nested logit 
model of column (V) in Table 4. 
 
===   Table 5 and Figures 2 & 3   === 
 
Last, we also estimate the four-stage nested logit model. We set the tree structure 
as described in Figure 4. The first decision is based on the results in Table 4 and is also 
the same as in the above three-stage nested logit model: [CLMV] or [China or 
ASEAN4]. The second decision under the choice of [China or ASEAN4] is whether to 
invest in either [China] or [ASEAN4], which is based on a slightly larger 
log-likelihood in column (I) than that in column (II). In the third decision, while the 
choice of [China] has two branches, [Coastal] and [Internal], the choice of [ASEAN4] 
involves the four branches of [Thailand], [the Philippines], [Malaysia], and [Indonesia]. 
On the other hand, the second decision under the choice of [CLMV] is where to invest 
among [Cambodia], [Laos], [Myanmar], and [Vietnam], and the third decision is the 
same as this, i.e., degenerate branches. The last decision is the choice of provinces. 
With these nests, we intend to uncover the location of Japanese MNEs in East Asian 
developing countries in greater detail. 
 
===   Figure 4   === 
 
The results for our four-stage nested logit model are reported in column (III) in 
Table 5 and are as follows. First, the results of explanatory variables are similar to 
those in the conditional-logit model. In particular, both “GRDP per Capita” and “Tariff 
rates in the Host,” which are supposed to be important location elements for vertical 
FDI, have significantly negative coefficients. One difference from the previous results 
is the significantly positive coefficient for “Asian Highway 2-digit,” albeit at the 10% 
significance level. Nevertheless, “Seaports/Airports” has an insignificant coefficient, 
indicating again that not ports per se but that road accessibility to ports matters. 
Second, the IV parameters at all levels are estimated to be between zero and one and 
are consistent with the RUM. Third, the log-likelihood rises remarkably. In sum, our 
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four-stage nest structure is better supported by the data than the previous 
two-/three-stage structures. Also, more importantly, the significance and even sign in 
some coefficients differ widely according to the tree structures. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Unlike most existing studies, this paper examines the location choices of MNEs in 
developing countries. We specifically explore the location choices among East Asian 
developing countries of Japanese MNEs using the four-stage nested logit model at the 
province level. Important results concerning location elements are as follows. In 
accordance with the mechanics of cheap labor-seeking FDI, Japanese MNEs are more 
likely to invest in low-income locations with low tariff rates on products from Japan. 
Moreover, accessibility to other locations and/or ports is important in attracting 
Japanese MNEs because it is essential when importing materials and exporting their 
products. Also important are WTO membership and bilateral investment treaties 
because they contribute to the settlement of trade and investment disputes, which are 
more likely to occur in developing countries. Last, although the literature on cheap 
labor-seeking FDI does not elucidate the role of market size, market potential plays a 
significant role, as in the case of market-seeking FDI. 
Due to the large inward FDI in China, policy makers in developing countries, 
especially ASEAN countries, have worried about the decrease in inward FDI in these 
countries because it has been replaced with FDI in China. As a result, our analysis in 
this paper provides the following interpretation on this matter or trend. One of the 
crucial elements in attracting Japanese FDI is WTO membership. Therefore, after 
China joined the WTO, Japanese FDI started going intensively to China rather than to 
the forerunners of ASEAN because China is a substitute in terms of investment 
destination. The latter argument is based on the result that the forerunners and China 
share the same upper-level tree in the nested logit model. However, since CLMV 
countries are taken as different groups of investment destinations from China, these 
countries, particularly Vietnam, still attract a lot of Japanese FDI even after China 
joined the WTO.  
As a result, we can say that unless ASEAN forerunners keep a better investment 
climate than China, Japanese MNEs are likely to invest in China instead of these 
countries. On the other hand, CLMV countries may keep attracting Japanese FDI to 
some extent. This difference seems to be based on how location advantages differ 
across countries/provinces. CLMV countries are still immature in terms of economic 
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development. Thus, the potential production stages that MNEs try to relocate from 
home to these countries are totally different from the case of China or the forerunners 
of ASEAN, in terms of technology level, capital-labor ratio, etc. However, since these 
location advantages are similar between China and the forerunners of ASEAN, they are 
in the fierce competition in attracting FDI. 
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Appendix 1. List of Locations 
 
Cambodia (24 Provinces) 
Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Kampong Cham, Kampong Chhnang, Kampong 
Speu, Kampong Thom, Kampot, Kandal, Koh Kong, Kratie, Pailin, Sihanoukville, 
Mondul Kiri, Oddar Meanchey, Phnom Penh, Pursat, Preah Vihear, Prey Veng, 
Ratanak Kiri, Siemreap, Stung Treng, Svay Rieng, Takeo, Kep 
 
Laos (17 Provinces) 
Vientiane Capital, Phongsaly, Loungnamtha, Oudomxay, Bokeo, Louangphabang, 
Houaphanh, Xaiyabouly, Xiengkhoung, Vientiane, Bolikhamxay, Khammouan, 
Savannakhet, Salavanh, Xekong, Champasak, Attapeu 
 
Myanmar (14 Provinces) 
Ayeyarwady, Bago, Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Magway, Mandalay, Mon, Rakhine, 
Sagaing, Shan, Tanintharyi, Yangon 
 
Vietnam (64 Provinces) 
Ha Noi, Ha Giang, Cao Bang, Bac Kan, Tuyen Quang, Lao Cai, Dien Bien, Lai Chau, 
Son La, Yen Bai, Hoa Binh, Thai Nguyen, Lang Son, Quang Ninh, Bac Giang, Phu 
Tho, Vinh Phuc, Bac Ninh, Ha Tay, Hai Duong, Hai Phong, Hung Yen, Thai Binh , Ha 
Nam, Nam Dinh, Ninh Binh, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Ha Tinh, Quang Binh, Quang Tri, 
Thua Thien-Hue, Da Nang, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai, Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh 
Hoa, Ninh Thuan, Binh Thuan, Kon Tum, Gia Lai, Dak Lak, Dak Nong, Lam Dong, 
Binh Phuoc, Tay Ninh, Binh Duong, Dong Nai, Ba Ria-Vung Tau, Ho Chi Minh, Long 
An, Tien Giang, Ben Tre, Tra Vinh, Vinh Long, Dong Thap, An Giang, Kien Giang, 
Can Tho, Hau Giang, Soc Trang, Bac Lieu, Ca Mau 
 
Thailand (76 Provinces) 
Amnat Charoen, Ang Thong, Bangkok, Buri Ram, Chachoengsao, Chai Nat, 
Chaiyaphum, Chanthaburi, Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Chonburi, Chumphon, Kalasin, 
Kamphaeng Phet, Kanchanaburi, Khon Kaen, Krabi, Lampang, Lamphun, Loei, 
Lopburi, Mae Hong Son, Maha Sarakham, Mukdahan, Nakhon Nayok, Nakhon 
Pathom, Nakhon Phanom, Nakhon Ratchasima, Nakhon Sawan, Nakhon Si 
Thammarat, Nan, Narathiwat, Nong Bua Lamphu, Nong Khai, Nonthaburi, Pathum 
Thani, Pattani, Phang Nga, Phatthalung, Phayao, Phetchabun, Phetchaburi, Phichit, 
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Phitsanulok, Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya, Phrae, Phuket, Prachinburi, Prachuap Khiri 
Khan, Ranong, Ratchaburi, Rayong, Roi Et, Sa Kaeo, Sakon Nakhon, Samut Prakan, 
Samut Sakhon, Samut Songkhram, Saraburi, Satun, Si Sa Ket, Sing Buri, Songkhla, 
Sukhothai, Suphan Buri, Surat Thani, Surin, Tak, Trang, Trat, Ubon Ratchathani, 
Udon Thani, Uthai Thani, Uttaradit, Yala, Yasothon 
 
Malaysia (16 Provinces) 
Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, Federal Territory of Labuan, Federal Territory of 
Putrajaya, Johor, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang, Perak, Perlis, 
Penang, Sabah, Sarawak, Selangor, Terengganu 
 
Indonesia (33 Provinces) 
Aceh, Bali, Bangka-Belitung, Banten, Bengkulu, Central Java, Central Kalimantan, 
Central Sulawesi, East Java, East Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara, Gorontalo, Jakarta 
Special Capital Region, Jambi, Lampung, Maluku (Moluccas), North Maluku 
(N.Moluccas), North Sulawesi, North Sumatra, Papua, Riau, Riau Islands, South East 
Sulawesi, South Kalimantan, South Sulawesi, South Sumatra, West Java, West 
Kalimantan, West Nusa Tenggara, West Papua, West Sulawesi, West Sumatra, 
Yogyakarta Special Region 
 
Philippines (17 Provinces) 
ARMM, CAR, NCR, Region I, Region II, Region III, Region IV-A, Region IV-B, 
Region IX, Region V, Region VI, Region VII, Region VIII, Region X, Region XI, 
Region XII, Region XIII 
 
China (30 Provinces) 
Beijing, Tienjin, Shanghai, Hebei, Shanxi, Neimenggu, Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang, 
Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hupei, Hunan, 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizeing, Shaanxi, Qansu, 
Qinghai, Ninghsia, Xinjiang 
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Appendix 2. List of Major Airports 
 
Wattay International Airport; Phnom Penh International Airport; Yangon International 
Airport; Noibai International Airport; Tansonnhat International Airport; Suvarnabhumi 
International Airport; Don Muang Airport; Chiang Mai International Airport; Phuket 
International Airport; Hat Yai International Airport; Samui Airport; Seltar Airport; 
Singapore Changi International Airport; Kuala Lumpur International Airport; Sultan 
Ismail Airport; Langkawi International Airport; Penang International Airport; Kota 
Kinabalu International Airport; Kuching International Airport; Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah 
Airport; Bali International Airport; Soekarno Hatta International Airport; Ninoy 
Aquind International Airport; Diosdado Macapagal International Airport; Mactan Cebu 
International Airport; Francisco Bangoy International Airport; Beijing Capital 
International Airport; Shanghai Hongqiao International Airport; Shanghai Pudong 
International Airport; Shenyang Taoxian International Airport; Wuhan Tianhe 
International Airport; Guangzhou Baiyun International Airport; Chengdu Shuangliu 
International Airport; Kunming Wujiaba International Airport; Xian Xianyang 
International Airport; Urumqi Diwopu International Airport 
 
 
 
Appendix 3. List of Major Seaports 
 
Port Klang; Hai Phong Port; Da Nang Port; Saigon Port; Port of Tanjung Pelepas; Bali 
Port; Tanjung Priok Port; Belawan Port; Makassar Port; Banjarmasin Port; Sorong 
Port; Port of Manila; Port of Tianjin; Port of Shanghai; Port of Qinhuangdao; Port of 
Dalian; Port of Yingkou; Port of Suzhou; Port of Ningbo; Port of Xiamen; Port of 
Qingdao; Port of Yantai; Port of Guangzhou; Port of Shenzhen; Port of Zhuhai 
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Table 1. Number of Entries of Japanese Affiliates 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
China 219 92 59 48 40 125 309 323 386 241 96
Coast 192 84 46 44 37 117 302 308 356 221 85
Internal 27 8 13 4 3 8 7 15 30 20 11
ASEAN 327 190 77 66 59 90 92 69 64 65 41
ASEAN4 281 162 58 55 51 81 81 52 49 38 21
Indonesia 79 49 15 8 6 16 19 10 4 3 3
Malaysia 43 23 11 10 10 7 5 6 8 4 3
Philippines 46 19 13 11 11 15 10 5 5 4 1
Thailand 113 71 19 26 24 43 47 31 32 27 14
CLMV 46 28 19 11 8 9 11 17 15 27 20
Cambodia 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
Laos 1 1 1 0 2 0 2 1 0 2 1
Myanmar 5 3 4 1 1 2 1 0 0 0 0
Vietnam 40 24 14 8 4 7 8 16 15 25 17  
Sources: Overseas Japanese Companies Data (Toyo Keizai Inc.); Foreign Direct Investment 
Companies in Myanmar (Myanmar Survey Research) for Japanese FDI in Myanmar; data on 
Japanese FDI in Cambodia and Laos, which were prepared by the Cambodia Investment Board and 
the Department of Domestic and Foreign Investment, Ministry of Planning and Investment, 
respectively.  
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Table 2. Top 25 Provinces in Terms of Entry of Japanese Affiliates during 1996-2006 
Rank Region Country Numbers
1 Jiangsu China 519
2 Guangdong China 356
3 Shanghai China 344
4 Zhejiang China 158
5 West Java Indonesia 133
6 Liaoning China 128
7 Shandong China 123
8 Bangkok Thailand 117
9 Region IV-A Philippines 96
10 Tienjin China 76
11 Rayong Thailand 66
12 Chonburi Thailand 61
13 Phra Nakhon Si Ayutthaya Thailand 59
14 Selangor Malaysia 54
15 Jakarta Special Capital Region Indonesia 49
16 Samut Prakan Thailand 48
17 Ha Noi Vietnam 46
18 Fujian China 40
19 Hebei China 40
20 Ho Chi Minh Vietnam 37
21 Beijing China 30
22 Hai Phong Vietnam 26
23 Pathum Thani Thailand 26
24 Chachoengsao Thailand 24
25 Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur Malaysia 23  
Sources: Overseas Japanese Companies Data (Toyo Keizai Inc.); “Foreign Direct Investment 
Companies in Myanmar (Myanmar Survey Research)” for Japanese FDI in Myanmar; data of 
Japanese FDI in Cambodian and Laos which were prepared by the “Cambodia Investment Board” 
and the “Department of Domestic and Foreign Investment, Ministry of Planning and Investment”, 
respectively.  
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Table 3. Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Market potential 349,448 21.518 0.439 19.229 22.695
GRDP per capita 349,448 6.938 1.001 4.621 9.909
Agglomeration 349,448 -1.400 8.353 -20.723 6.441
Distance from Japan 349,448 8.267 0.319 7.334 8.824
Seaports/Airports 349,448 0.337 0.473 0 1
Asian Highway 1-digit 349,448 0.407 0.491 0 1
Asian Highway 2-digit 349,448 0.333 0.471 0 1
Tariff rates in Host 349,448 0.150 0.111 0 0.672
WTO membership 349,448 0.647 0.478 0 1
BIT 349,448 0.281 0.449 0 1  
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Table 4. Exploring the Nesting Structure: Nested Logit Model 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII)
Province-level variables
Market potential 0.584*** 1.708*** 0.265*** 0.959*** 0.267*** 0.673*** 1.010***
[0.060] [0.260] [0.038] [0.109] [0.039] [0.078] [0.114]
GRDP per capita -0.096** -0.223* 0.053** -0.313*** 0.062** -0.139*** -0.219***
[0.043] [0.122] [0.024] [0.073] [0.024] [0.051] [0.066]
Agglomeration 0.627*** 1.925*** 0.354*** 0.783*** 0.386*** 0.658*** 0.793***
[0.018] [0.218] [0.021] [0.033] [0.017] [0.023] [0.034]
Distance from Japan -0.548*** -1.215*** -0.367*** -0.603*** -0.391*** -0.556*** -0.617***
[0.102] [0.322] [0.058] [0.138] [0.061] [0.111] [0.147]
Seaports/Airports 0.065 0.269 -0.028 0.124 -0.032 0.068 -0.026
[0.058] [0.181] [0.032] [0.080] [0.034] [0.063] [0.086]
Asian Highway 1-digit 0.374*** 1.075*** 0.168*** 0.613*** 0.167*** 0.430*** 0.629***
[0.046] [0.174] [0.027] [0.077] [0.028] [0.057] [0.079]
Asian Highway 2-digit -0.014 -0.036 0.007 0.005 0.003 -0.004 0.07
[0.049] [0.151] [0.026] [0.068] [0.028] [0.054] [0.072]
Country-level variables
Tariff rates in Host -1.756*** -0.477 -0.592** -2.447*** 0.091 -2.189*** -3.090***
[0.320] [0.458] [0.268] [0.358] [0.202] [0.399] [0.517]
WTO membership 0.643*** 0.724*** 0.996*** 0.447*** 0.830*** 0.577*** 0.673***
[0.084] [0.122] [0.064] [0.097] [0.049] [0.096] [0.120]
BIT 1.110*** 1.577*** 1.314*** 1.154*** 0.927*** 1.181*** 1.779***
[0.103] [0.299] [0.074] [0.127] [0.066] [0.115] [0.184]
Dissimilarity parameters 3.103 0.534 1.388 0.572 1.086 1.434
[0.350] [0.029] [0.068] [0.022] [0.040] [0.070]
LR test for IIA 85.84*** 112.85*** 45.32*** 205.84*** 5.12** 58.73***
Number of observations 349,448 349,448 349,448 349,448 349,448 349,448 349,448
Number of cases 2,888 2,888 2,888 2,888 2,888 2,888
Pseudo R2 0.2684
Log likelihood -10133 -10090 -10077 -10110 -10030 -10130 -10104  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. “LR test for IIA” indicates the test statistics on the null 
hypothesis that the dissimilarity parameter is unity. The groups in the upper level are (II): 
[ASEAN4 & CLMV] vs. [Coastal China & Internal China]; (III): [ASEAN4 vs. CLMV] vs. 
[Coastal China & Internal China]; (IV): [ASEAN4] vs. [CLMV] vs. [Coastal China] vs. [Internal 
China]; (V): [CLMV] vs. [ASEAN4 & Coastal China & Internal China]; (VI): [CLMV] vs. 
[ASEAN4 & Coastal China] vs. [Internal China]; (VII): [CLMV & Internal China] vs. [ASEAN4 
& Coastal China]. 
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Table 5. Higher Level of the Nested Logit Model 
(I) (II) (III)
Province-level variables
Market potential 0.276*** 0.281*** 0.523***
[0.040] [0.044] [0.057]
GRDP per capita 0.055** 0.049 -0.164***
[0.026] [0.032] [0.036]
Agglomeration 0.396*** 0.398*** 0.486***
[0.019] [0.024] [0.024]
Distance from Japan -0.402*** -0.399*** -0.393***
[0.063] [0.064] [0.080]
Seaports/Airports -0.026 -0.027 -0.032
[0.035] [0.036] [0.047]
Asian Highway 1-digit 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.266***
[0.029] [0.029] [0.039]
Asian Highway 2-digit -0.001 0.002 0.074*
[0.029] [0.029] [0.038]
Country-level variables
Tariff rates in Host 0.129 0.077 -0.440*
[0.197] [0.202] [0.231]
WTO membership 0.793*** 0.821*** 0.953***
[0.055] [0.051] [0.063]
BIT 0.869*** 0.871*** 0.697***
[0.079] [0.106] [0.094]
Dissimilarity parameters
1st-level 0.541 0.565 0.656
[0.031] [0.024] [0.039]
2nd-level 0.589 0.589 0.460
[0.025] [0.034] [0.022]
3rd-level 0.816
[0.043]
LR test for IIA 207.51*** 206.29*** 368.32***
Number of observations 349,448 349,448 349,448
Number of cases 2,888 2,888 2,888
Log likelihood -10029 -10030 -9949  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate, respectively, the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of statistical significance. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. “LR test for IIA” indicates the test statistics on the null 
hypothesis that the dissimilarity parameter is unity. The tree structures in (I), (II), and (III) are 
illustrated in Figures 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of New Japanese Affiliates during 1996-2006 
 
Sources: Overseas Japanese Companies Data (Toyo Keizai Inc.); “Foreign Direct Investment 
Companies in Myanmar (Myanmar Survey Research)” for Japanese FDI in Myanmar; data of 
Japanese FDI in Cambodian and Laos which were prepared by the “Cambodia Investment Board” 
and the “Department of Domestic and Foreign Investment, Ministry of Planning and Investment”, 
respectively.  
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Figure 2. Three-level Nested Tree: China versus ASEAN4 
 
 
Figure 3. Three-level Nested Tree: Competition among China and ASEAN4 Countries 
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Figure 4. Four-level Nested Tree 
 
 
